




Selective Contracting and Foreclosure in Health Care Markets
Bijlsma, M.; Boone, J.; Zwart, Gijsbert
Publication date:
2009
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Bijlsma, M., Boone, J., & Zwart, G. (2009). Selective Contracting and Foreclosure in Health Care Markets.
(CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2009-89). Macroeconomics.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.



















































Selective contracting and foreclosure in health care
markets∗
Michiel Bijlsma†, Jan Boone‡and Gijsbert Zwart§
November 16, 2009
Abstract
We analyze exclusive contracts between health care providers and insurers in a model
where some consumers choose to stay uninsured. In case of a monopoly insurer, exclusion
of a provider changes the distribution of consumers who choose not to insure. Although
the foreclosed care provider remains active in the market for the non-insured, we show that
exclusion leads to anti-competitive effects on this non-insured market. As a consequence
exclusion can raise industry profits, and then occurs in equilibrium. Under competitive
insurance markets, the anticompetitive exclusive equilibrium survives. Uninsured con-
sumers, however, are now not better off without exclusion. Competition among insurers
raises prices in equilibria without exclusion, as a result of a horizontal analogue to the
double marginalization effect. Instead, under competitive insurance markets exclusion is
desirable as long as no provider is excluded by all insurers.
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1. Introduction
Health care expenditure in OECD countries increases with 5 to 10% in real terms per annum.
Policymakers face the challenges of limiting the costs of health care while at the same time
guaranteeing access to care. The health economics literature suggests selective contracting
between insurers and health care providers as a way to meet these twin challenges.
The argument goes as follows (see, for instance, Dranove and White (1999, pp. 41) and
Haas-Wilson (2003, pp. 40)). Health care providers have market power. For several reasons
consumers do not shop around and search for the best price-quality combination.1 In contrast,
insurers do have an incentive to shop around for the lowest price as their search costs are spread
over thousands of insured. Selective contracting increases the bargaining power of insurers vis-
a-vis providers, because an insurer can credibly threaten to steer his customers away from a
hospital that does not reduce its price. This allows insurers to extract more rents from providers
by reducing their payments for treatments. Indeed, empirical work such as Town and Vistnes
(2001) has confirmed such effects of selective contracting on bargaining power in the US. As
long as there is enough competition in the insurance market, the benefit of such lower prices
are then passed on to consumers, so the argument continues. Hence selective contracting is
supposed to lead to lower treatment prices and lower insurance premia. In this way it reduces
costs and makes insurance accessible to more consumers, thereby helping to meet the mentioned
twin challenges.
In policy circles, these benefits of selective contracting are viewed with suspicion on the
grounds that such contracts reduce choice for consumers, and perhaps inefficiently so. In the
US there is an intense discussion on the trade-off between cost reduction and patient satisfaction
(see e.g. Sloan, Rattliff and Hall (2005) ). In reflection of this unsettled discussion, just over
half of all US states have adopted Any-Willing-Provider or Freedom-of-Choice laws restricting
the scope for selective contracting (Vita (2001)).
In many countries a market for uninsured care exists besides a market for insured care.
In the US insurance is not mandatory. As a consequence, a large part of the population has
no health care insurance. In other countries, like the Netherlands and Switzerland, health
insurance is mandatory for “basic treatments”, but health insurance for other treatments is
voluntary.
This creates an additional challenge. For people without insurance, health care should still
be affordable for at least the following three reasons. First, if uninsured care is expensive,
people may forgo treatments that are actually necessary (and efficient from a social point of
view). Second, we know that in a country like the US income and (having) health insurance
are positively correlated. In the words of Gruber (2008, pp. 576) “the modal uninsured person
1First, consumers with insurance have a reduced (or even no) incentive to look for the lowest price. Second,
even if a consumer has an economic incentive to shop around, he would do so only when he is ill. This tends
to increase search costs which reduce the number of hospitals compared. Third, consumers may not have all
relevant information to make the comparison. Hospitals do not tend to price per treatment but per service.
This makes it hard for customers to understand ex ante what the price of a hospital will be (Dranove (2000,
pp. 73/4)).
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is a member of what might be called the ’working poor class’: below median income, but not
among the poorest in the nation”. From an equity point of view it is undesirable that relatively
poor people do not get treatment because they cannot afford it. Finally, government often ends
up paying for care that is not paid for by other means. As estimated by Hadley and Holahan
(2003, pp. 77), in 2001 US federal and state governments paid hospitals $23.6 billion to cover
uncompensated care for the uninsured.
We argue that in markets where insured and uninsured care coexist, selective contracting
does not necessarily imply beneficial effects (only). We use insights from the literature on
exclusive contracts (in particular, Bernheim and Whinston (1998)) to make the following three
points. First, selective contracting can raise prices for uninsured care. Second, although in that
case selective contracting can indeed lead to cheaper insurance, the reason for this is not that
insurers pass on rents extracted from providers. It happens because insurers sell an inferior
product (with reduced choice set of providers). In this sense selective contracting leads to a
trade off in terms of the twin challenges above. It does make insurance cheaper, but people
that (still) go without insurance are worse off. This last effect raises the probability of under-
treatment for uninsured patients (see IOM (2009) for a recent report on this). Third, the
solution to these potentially anti competitive effects is not to ban selective contracting. The
structure of contractual relationships matters for determining the harmful or beneficial effects
of selective contracts. For some types of selective contracts, harmful effects do not occur and
insurance is cheaper than in the absence of selective contracts. The policy implication is that
selective contracts should raise alarm bells if all insurers exclude a care provider with market
power in the uninsured market.
In the health care literature, several papers capture the benefits of selective contracting.
Gal-Or (1997) finds that with homogeneous insurers, there is no exclusionary equilibrium.
Further, if (with insurer differentiation) there is an exclusionary outcome, consumers prefer
this above the common outcome. Gaynor and Ma (1996) find that selective contracting does
not lead to anti-competitive effects. These papers differ from our analysis in the following
aspects. Gaynor and Ma (1996) and Gal-Or (1997) do not consider the non-insured market.2
Gal-Or (1997) introduces a bargaining imperfection by ruling out two-part tariffs. This is not
realistic as we know that combinations of capitation and fee for service contracts are used in
health care. In particular, fear of supplier induced demand has led many insurers to use two-
part tariffs. Gaynor and Ma (1996) do consider two-part tariff contracts and they allow for
insurance contracts with co-payments, which we do not analyze. However, they consider given
settings with and without exclusive contracts. The Bernheim and Whinston (1998) framework
that we use allows us to endogenize contract types by letting hospitals choose the type of
contract they want to offer to the insurer. These differences turn out to be crucial.3
2A recent paper that also considers the effects of the non-insured on competition among insurers (but that
does not address selective contracting) is Fombaron and Milcent (2007).
3A related paper on vertical integration –not on selective contracting– is Ma (1997). He considers markets
where consumers buy options to consume. An example here is health insurance. He shows that vertical
integration leads to foreclosure. However, his framework is different from ours as he assumes that consumers
have to buy health insurance in order to be able to consume health care services. That is, there is no uninsured
market in his model.
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Selective contracting is a form of exclusion. The generally positive view on selective contracts
in the health economics literature is in stark contrast to the Post-Chicago view on exclusive
contracts in the industrial organization literature. This literature stresses the anti-competitive
effects of exclusionary contracts. Aghion and Bolton (1987) point out that exclusive contracts
may help an incumbent upstream and downstream firm to extract rents from an upstream
entrant. Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) point to a
coordination failure among downstream firms through which exclusive contracts can be forced
upon buyers although they are not in buyers’ collective interest. The general insight from these
papers is that exclusive contracts can be accepted in equilibrium while being detrimental for
welfare due to the external effects of the contract on parties not present when contracts are
negotiated.4
To analyze the effects of selective contracting, we stay within this industrial organization
literature and use the Bernheim and Whinston (1998) framework. As in that paper, upstream
firms - care providers - make contract offers to downstream firms, insurers. We deviate from
their framework in three respects. First, all parties are symmetrically placed: no firm has
to incur an entry cost and offers are made simultaneously by providers to insurers. Second,
we assume that upstream providers can sell directly to final consumers; this is the market
for uninsured care that we want to focus on. Third, whereas Bernheim and Whinston (1998)
consider markets with two upstream firms and one downstream firm (with different downstream
firms in consecutive markets), we also consider the case with two upstream and two downstream
firms in one market.
The insight of our paper that leads to anti-competitive effects of selective contracting is
the externality of selective contracting on the non-insured market (which is the non-coincident
market in the terminology of Bernheim and Whinston (1998)). We model two hospitals that are
differentiated on an Hotelling line. Geographic differentiation is a natural interpretation here,
but it can also capture differences in treatments used or other aspects that some consumers like
while others do not. If insurers contract with only one provider instead of two, the following
happens. The excluded provider faces relatively many uninsured customers close to its location.
For these consumers, insurance is less attractive as they would have to travel far to receive
insured care. Hence the excluded provider faces relatively many inframarginal consumers, which
drive up the price for uninsured care at this provider. Assuming price competition, reaction
functions are upward sloping and the contracted provider also raises its price for uninsured
care. Hence we have anti-competitive effects even though the excluded provider does not leave
the market.5 The final step is to observe that high prices for uninsured care make insurance
4As pointed out by Spector (2007), in real world competition cases it is not always clear that these theories
apply. In particular, the assumption that the party negatively affected by an exclusionary contract was not
present at the time the contract was negotiated is often not satisfied. Hence this party should have made
counter-offers to avoid the exclusionary contract being accepted. In our model it is the uninsured that are
negatively affected by selective contracting. For obvious reasons, like free riding, it is natural to assume that
the uninsured are not able to make counter offers when an insurer and provider bargain an exclusive deal.
5This result is reminiscent of Wright (2008) who finds that exclusionary contracts can be anti-competitive
even if they do not foreclose entry, by changing the intensity of competition. We find a similar result through
a different mechanism.
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more attractive. Excluding a provider can therefore raise industry profits, which is a necessary
and sufficient condition for exclusion to take place (the first “general principle” in Bernheim
and Whinston (1998)). As mentioned, a necessary condition for such anti-competitive effects
is that the excluded provider has market power on the uninsured market. If there is no such
market power, selective contracting does not require intervention. If the excluded provider
cannot raise the uninsured price due to competitive restraints (and there are no efficiency gains
due to exclusion) the common outcome is more profitable for all firms involved than exclusion.
Hence, in this case, we expect to see the common outcome in equilibrium.
When there is competition at the insurer level as well, more configurations of exclusive
relations exist. Depending on which provider contracts with which insurer, outcomes with
selective contracts may or may not be symmetric. We show that the same asymmetric exclusive
outcome as that occurring under monopoly insurance persists in this case. On the other hand,
configurations where each provider has an exclusive contract (with at least one insurer) do not
feature such anti-competitive effects. In fact, these outcomes lead to cheaper insurance than in
situations without selective contracts. The reason is that the common equilibrium is plagued
by a double marginalization problem. Both providers’ inputs are essential for an insurer to
offer common contracts, but either hospital fails to take into account the reduction in its rival’s
profits due to a raise in its own transfer price.
In section 2, we introduce the general contracting game that underlies our analysis of exclu-
sive and common contracts. We show that the option of selective contracting indeed increases
rents for insurers. However, this rent is transferred using the fixed part of the two-part tar-
iff. Hence, the price per treatment is not reduced for the insurer and hence this effect does
not reduce the insurance premium. In section 3 we present an explicit model of one insurer
contracting with two differentiated healthcare providers and study the common and exclusive
equilibrium of this model. We show that selective contracting can indeed have anti-competitive
effects. In Section 4 we analyze what happens to our results if two competing insurers contract
with two healthcare providers. We show that the anti-competitive effects of the exclusion out-
come (with a monopoly insurer) do not disappear with insurer competition. Further, we show
that banning selective contracting is not optimal either. Section 5 discusses the implications of
our analysis and makes suggestions for future research. In our analysis we assume that selective
contracting does not affect providers’ or insurers’ efficiency and we focus on anti-competitive
effects. In section 5 we return to this issue. Section 6 concludes. Proofs of results are in the
appendix.
2. The contracting game
Before we specify the game determining insurance and provider prices, we look at the contract-
ing game between a monopoly insurer and providers using reduced form profits. We characterize
equilibria in selective contracts and derive conditions for equilibria without exclusion to exist.
We then show that rent extraction from health care providers may indeed be a motivation for
encouraging selective contracting by insurers, as claimed in the health care literature. This
happens, however, via the fixed fee (in a two-part tariff) and is therefore unlikely (by itself) to
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lead to lower prices for health insurance.
We consider a market with two providers P1, P2 and one insurer I. This is the simplest set-up
in which we can analyze the effect of exclusive contracting. The contracting game endogenizes
the choice between exclusive and common (i.e. no exclusion) contracts, the (marginal) prices
at which the insurer buys treatments from the provider and the fixed fees used to allocate
the surplus realized among the various players.6 Following Bernheim and Whinston (1998),
we make the crucial assumption that providers bilaterally negotiate with the insurer. Either
provider can only observe whether the insurer has also contracted with its rival, but cannot
observe the terms of this contract. Hence I and Pi can contract upon whether or not I deals
with Pj (j 6= i). But they cannot contract upon the details of a contract between I and Pj.
Again following Bernheim and Whinston (1998), we assume that providers make the offers
which the insurer may only accept or reject.7 First, we introduce some notation. In the
case where the insurer has a contract exclusively with provider Pi, we denote equilibrium
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We can now, by a straightforward extension of the arguments in Bernheim and Whinston
(1998), prove the following
Lemma 1 An exclusionary equilibrium always exists. If total sector profits are lower under
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6In health care, two-part tariffs often take the form of a combination of capitation and fee-for-service pay-
ments (see, for example, Glied (2000, pp. 714) and Scott (2000, pp. 1188)). When insurers bargain with
hospitals, they bargain over a range of products (treatments). It is unlikely that this leads to linear pricing for
each product separately.
7The advantage of this assumption is that we do not need to specify the beliefs (wary, passive or otherwise)
that Pi has with respect to the offer that I makes to Pj (j 6= i).
8If p̃i would not maximize joint profits, it is optimal for I and Pi to adjust p̃i and use the fixed part of the
tariff to distribute the additional profit between them.
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Both providers compete to become the exclusive provider. In equilibrium the rents left to
the insurer should be sufficiently high to leave the excluded provider P2 indifferent between
having a contract and being excluded from insured care. That is, if the coalition of P2 and I
would deviate and sign a bilateral exclusive contract they would earn Π
(2)
bilateral. Indeed, this is
also what they earn (together) in the outcome where P1 is the exclusive provider.
The mere possibility of an exclusive deal also serves to restrict rent extraction by the
providers under common representation. If under common representation a provider insists
on too large a fraction of the rents, its rival and the insurer have a mutual interest in deviating
to an exclusive contract, sharing the resulting rents to leave both better off. Again if I and Pi
were to deviate to an exclusive contract, they would jointly earn Π
(i)
bilateral, which by lemma 1
equals their bilateral profit in the common outcome. Note that if total profits under exclusion
are higher than under common representation, there is always an incentive to deviate from the
common contract. In that case, there is no equilibrium with common representation.
If an equilibrium with common representation exists, the possibility of selective contracting
increases the rents left to the insurer by creating a valuable outside option. Selective contracting
therefore helps in extracting rents from providers with market power. Formally, we have the
following.




total, so that there exist both exclusionary and common equilibria, the
insurer’s profits are higher under the exclusive equilibria.
At first sight, this might provide a rationale for the benevolence of policymakers towards
selective contracting: it is through the insurer channel that rents are extracted from health
care providers. The rent extraction, however, occurs through the fixed transfer and not the
price per treatment. Therefore, one should not expect that these rents are passed on to the
consumers.




total, leading to exclusive
equilibria. Exclusion in the insurance market may raise industry profits because it affects
providers’ behavior in the adjacent market of health care for the non-insured.
3. Anti-competitive effects of exclusion
In this section we introduce a model of the health care market and the health insurance market
with two providers and one insurer. We characterize treatment prices and the insurance pre-
mium in the common and exclusive outcomes. We show that exclusionary contracts can have
anti-competitive effects in the presence of an adjacent market of health care for the non-insured.
3.1. The model
Risk averse consumers can either buy health insurance, in which case the insurer pays for treat-
ment costs in case of illness, or go without insurance and pay for treatments themselves (if
needed). For simplicity we assume that health insurance provides full coverage of (monetary)
7
health expenditures.9 Providers are differentiated, which we model with a Hotelling beach. A
natural interpretation is that providers are spatially differentiated, but other forms of differ-
entiation in product space are captured as well. Consumers are uniformly distributed on the
Hotelling line of length one. Provider P1 is located on the far left and P2 on the far right. Con-
sumers know their preference for either hospital (i.e. their location on the Hotelling line), and
are aware of which providers the insurer has contracted with.10 If the insurer has an exclusive
contract with one provider, we assume that insured customers can only go to that provider and
get their costs reimbursed. Hence, under exclusion, all insured consumers in need of care will
visit the exclusive hospital.
We assume the following timing of the game:
1. the providers Pi offer the insurer I contracts with the following features: a price per
treatment p̃i, a fixed transfer and possibly an exclusivity clause;
2. the insurer decides on which contract(s) to accept;
3. the insurer chooses the insurance premium φ;
4. the consumers choose whether or not to buy insurance;
5. the providers decide on prices pi for uninsured treatments.
Once the insurer and providers agree on prices and contract terms, the insurer knows what
expected treatment costs will be and hence can calculate the optimal insurance premium.
Once the premium is known, consumers can decide whether or not to buy insurance. Finally,
providers choose prices for uninsured care. That is, nothing stops providers from adjusting
prices for uninsured care after consumers have decided whether or not to buy health insurance.
Put differently, providers cannot commit to uninsured prices in the early stages of the game.
The cost of treatment is the same for both providers and equal to c ≥ 0. An agent gets a
negative health shock γ > c with probability 1 − F . Treatment reduces this disutility to zero
and is thus socially efficient (as γ > c). Apart from the consumers’ position x on the Hotelling
beach, we introduce one more dimension of information asymmetry: consumers differ in their
degree of risk aversion, measured by the parameter σ ∈ [0, σ̄] with distribution function G(.)
and density function g(.). We assume an atomless distribution G(σ) which is independent from
x.
9Clearly, if insurers can offer partial coverage, they may be able to price-discriminate among different types
more effectively and by doing so raise their profits.
10Others, like Gal-Or (1997), assume that consumers do not know ex ante which provider they will prefer
in case they need treatment. Either assumption is plausible depending on the treatment and the form of
differentiation between providers. If we interpret our Hotelling beach as geographic differentiation, it is well
known that people prefer hospitals that are close. In the words of Capps, Dranove and Satterthwaite (2003,
pp. 739) “Many patients, especially those with conditions that are relatively straightforward to treat, have
a strong preference to go to a convenient, nearby hospital”. This preference consumers know when choosing
insurance.
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Expected utility costs of a consumer without insurance are the price charged by the health
care provider and the travel cost to the provider plus σ times the variance of the expected
costs. The expected disutility for a consumer located at x of relying on non-insured care from
provider P1 is therefore given by
E(p1 + tx) + σV (p1 + tx)
where the expectation is over the probability 1 − F of falling ill. The expected costs for a
consumer with insurance when going to provider 1 are
φ + E(tx) + σV (tx)
Recall that insurance covers the price of treatment, not the travel cost. Since travel costs can
be in product space this is a reasonable assumption. Similar expressions, with x replaced by
1 − x, obtain for consumers going to provider P2.
3.2. Common equilibrium
Let us first consider a common equilibrium where the insurer contracts with both providers.
We analyze the model by backward induction. Given φ, we solve for the symmetric equilibrium
in provider prices for the non-insured, pc. Consumers choose whether to insure before these
prices are set. We assume rational expectations on the part of consumers. Suppose consumers
expect a pair of prices p̂c = p̂1 = p̂2 for uninsured treatments. They then decide whether or
not to take insurance based upon their risk aversion parameter σ. Specifically, there will be a
threshold value for σ that depends on p̂c, φ and varies with x. Only those with risk aversion
above this threshold value will choose to insure. Consumers on the left-hand-side of x = 1/2
choose between paying a premium φ for insurance, or not taking out insurance and paying p̂c
to provider 1 when they get sick. The threshold σ(x, φ, p̂c) is defined by
φ + E(tx) + σ (x, φ, p̂c) V (tx) = E (p̂c + tx) + σ (x, φ, p̂c)V (p̂c + tx)
or, defining φ̃ ≡ φ/(1 − F )
σ (x, φ, p̂c) =
φ̃ − p̂c
F (p̂2c + 2p̂ctx)
(1)
A similar expression obtains, with x replaced by 1−x for consumers on the right-hand-side
of x = 1/2. Note that ∂
∂x
σ (x, φ, p̂c) < 0 (for x <
1
2
), i.e. you run more risk (in terms of costs)
if you are further away from the provider and hence insurance becomes more attractive.
The providers then choose prices given the profile of non-insured. The profit of provider P1
from uninsured consumers if it charges p1 is given by
(1 − F )
∫ x̄
0
G (σ (x, φ; p̂c)) (p1 − c) dx
9




, and similarly for P2. The first-order condition for providers P1, P2 in a
symmetric equilibrium where p1 = p2 = pc then reads













Clearly, for x-independent σ we have the standard Hotelling equilibrium price pc − c = t.
Rational expectations requires this first order condition to hold for p̂c = pc,













The solution will in general be a function of φ: pc(φ).
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We now turn to the earlier stages of the game. Both insurer and providers will correctly
anticipate the relation between φ and prices for the non-insured, pc(φ). In the contracting
stage, each provider will want to make sure that it optimizes its joint profits with the insurer
(since surplus can be transferred between them through the fixed parts of the two-part tariffs);
the instruments available to the providers for achieving this joint profit optimization are their
respective linear components of the two-part tariffs, the transfer prices p̃i. Moreover, joint
profit optimization is subject to the insurer optimizing its individual profits by choosing φ.12




















The insurer optimizes this profit over the insurance premium φ (taking into account also the
effect on pc). The insurer’s optimal choice of φ is a function of both p̃i’s. The profits for












[1 − G (σ (x, φ, pc))] dx (p̃i − c)

















G (σ (x, φ, pc)) dx (pc − c)
with both φ and pc determined by the transfer prices p̃i.
Summarizing, we have the following result.
11Note that we impose subgame perfection here. If pc > φ̃, everyone buys insurance and pc is undetermined.
Hence pc > φ̃ can be a Nash equilibrium. But it is not subgame perfect in the following sense. Consider a
customer at x = 1
2
who deviates from this equilibrium by not buying insurance. He should expect pc to satisfy
equation (2). If he is the only one to deviate, this boils down to pc = c.
12We assume φ itself is not contractible for providers. In other words, I cannot commit to φ when bargaining
with P1 and P2.
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Lemma 3 In a common equilibrium, Pi’s treatment price pc for non-insured patients is given
(implicitly) by equation (2). The price p̃i paid by I for treatment of one of its customers at Pi
is chosen so that the insurer’s profit maximizing choice of φ (also) maximizes bilateral profits
of I and Pi (with i = 1, 2).
3.3. Exclusive equilibrium
In this subsection, we analyze exclusive contracting with one provider, which we take to be
provider P1 without loss of generality. If the insurer only contracts with P1, this will change
the density of customers choosing insurance in an asymmetric way. A customer on the right-
hand side now has to choose between taking insurance and incurring the additional costs of
traveling to provider P1 on the one hand, and not taking insurance and going to the nearby
provider P2 on the other. This causes the equilibrium distribution of non-insured consumers
to be skewed. The density of non-insured on the right-hand side will be larger than on the
left-hand side. As a result, the two providers’ prices are no longer symmetric, p1 6= p2, and as
σ (x) is now steeper for consumers close to provider P2, the latter will have a larger incentive to
raise its price p2. Since the two goods are strategic complements, this tends to raise p1 as well.
Hence we find that selective contracting leads to anti-competitive effects even if the “excluded”
provider does not leave the market.
We now make this argument explicit. Again, first we focus on the final stage to find the
(rational expectations) asymmetric equilibrium with p2 > p1. Suppose that consumers expect






then go to provider P1, whether or not they are insured. They face the same choice as under
the common equilibrium resulting in the same threshold function for σ
σ (x, φ; p̂1, p̂2) =
φ − E (p̂1)
V (p̂1 + tx) − V (tx)
=
φ̃ − p̂1
F (p̂21 + 2p̂1tx)
for x < x̂ (3)
The situation is different, however, for x > x̂. Here, consumers trade-off the costs of
insurance and going to provider P1 against the costs of no insurance compensated by lower
travel costs (and going to provider P2):
φ + E(tx) + σ (x, φ; p̂1, p̂2) V (tx) = E(p̂2 + t(1 − x)) + σ (x, φ; p̂1, p̂2) V (p̂2 + t(1 − x))
so we have
σ (x, φ; p̂1, p̂2) =




2 − 2 (p̂2 + t) tx
) for x > x̂ (4)
Note that σ (x, φ; p̂1, p̂2) is continuous at x = x̂. Further, this expression is only valid if
φ̃ − p̂1, φ̃ − (p̂2 + t) + 2tx > 0.
13
13If the expression for σ turns negative, it means that there is an interval [x̄l, x̄r] on the Hotelling beach where
everyone is insured. We do not consider this case.
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Given consumers’ choices whether or not to buy insurance, i.e., given the profile of non-
insured, the health care providers choose prices to optimize their profit from the uninsured
consumers. Rational expectations once more imply that pi (p̂1, p̂2) = p̂i. To determine pi (p̂1, p̂2),
we consider again the first order condition for provider Pi given expected prices p̂2, p̂1. The
profit of provider 1 from uninsured consumers now reads
∫ x̄
0
G (σ (x, φ; p̂1, p̂2)) (p1 − c) dx




. Prices consistent with rational expectations now satisfy
p1 − c = 2t
∫ x̄
0
G (σ (x, φ; p1, p2)) dx
G (σ (x̄, φ; p1, p2))
(5)
p2 − c = 2t
∫ 1
x̄
G (σ (x, φ; p1, p2)) dx
G (σ (x̄, φ; p1, p2))
where also x̄ = x̂.
Again, in general these prices depend on φ. Let us call the solution pi (φ). To ease notation,






(1 − G (σ (x, φ))) dx(φ̃ − p̃1)
where p̃1 is the transfer price. The insurer and the provider P1 now jointly choose the transfer













(G (σ (x, φ))) dx [p1 (φ) − c] (6)
We can simplify this expression by using the first-order conditions (5) for the prices to
eliminate the integrals. We have
πI + π1
1 − F
= φ̃ − c −
1
2t










with pi given, as a function of φ, by (5). As equations (5) imply that p1, p2 ≥ c, φ̃ ≤ c would
imply that joint profits of I and P1 are non-positive. This is clearly not optimal and hence we
have
φ̃ > c (7)
Summarizing this analysis, we have
Lemma 4 In an exclusive equilibrium, Pi’s treatment price pi for non-insured patients is deter-
mined (implicitly) by equations (5). The price paid by I for treatment of one of its customers at
P1 equals p̃1, which is chosen so as to achieve a φ that optimizes bilateral profits of the insurer
and provider P1.
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We can next compare the prices for the non-insured under the exclusive and the common
equilibrium. First we demonstrate that the asymmetric exclusive equilibrium helps to raise
uninsured prices (for given choice of φ).
Proposition 1 For a given φ ≥ (1 − F )c, let pc(φ) denote the solution to equation (2) and
pe1(φ), p
e
2(φ) the solution to equations (5). Assuming p




and pc(φ) < pe1(φ) < p
e
2(φ) (8)
The intuition behind this result is that, under exclusion, relatively many uninsured are close
to the excluded provider P2. That is, P2 faces many inframarginal, non-insured, consumers who
are reluctant to go to P1. This raises P2’s price on the non-insured market. Since providers
compete in prices, reaction functions are upward sloping. Consequently, p1 is higher in the
exclusive outcome as well. Hence for given φ exclusive contracts soften competition between
hospitals in the market for uninsured care. Note though, that in equilibrium φ will be different
in the exclusive and common outcomes.
We are now ready to show our main result. The desire to strategically influence prices for the
non-insured (and the consequences of these prices for total sector profits) is indeed the driver of
exclusive outcomes. To demonstrate this, we argue that if for some exogenous reason prices for
the non-insured are prevented from rising, the common outcome will always dominate selective
contracting for the three firms I, P1, P2. That is, industry profits are higher under common
than under selective contracting. Let pr denote an (exogenously specified) upper-bound for
P2’s price for non-insured care.
14 Below we give four interpretations of pr.
Theorem 1 Suppose p2 ≤ pr is binding in the common equilibrium. Then the common equi-
librium always dominates selective contracting.
One interpretation of pr is that prices for non-insured health care are regulated. The health
care regulator has stipulated that the price cannot exceed pr. A second interpretation is that
intense competition t = 0 between providers P1 and P2 results in pr = c. Providers are
not able to raise uninsured prices above marginal costs c due to intense price competition.
Third, consider the case where P1 and P2 can collude on the monopoly price in the non-insured
market. Assume t is low enough that the monopoly price under common representation is given
by γ − 1
2
t. In these three cases the upper bound pr applies to p1 as well. As a final example,
consider the case where pr is only binding for p2. This happens, for instance, if there is a third
provider P3 also at position x = 1 offering the same service as P2 at costs c3 ≥ c. In that case
pr = c3. For c3 close enough to c, this constraint is binding and p2 = c3 under both common
and exclusive contracts.
In each of these four cases the proof of theorem 1 implies that selective contracting will not
be used.
14The upper bound pr can apply to p1 as well, the proof does not depend on this. However, the important














Figure 1: Distribution of uninsured in common and exclusionary equilibrium with G(σ) =
σ/σ̄, c = 0, t = 1, F σ̄ = 2.
Hence in our set up selective contracting is only profitable if it allows the providers to push
up non-insured prices. If this is not feasible, for example due to regulation or intense competi-
tion, or no longer desirable, for example because providers already charge the monopoly price,
common representation dominates selective contracting. In this sense, selective contracting is
used by providers and insurer for its anti-competitive effects.
As the next subsection illustrates, although uninsured care becomes more expensive, this
does not imply that insurance becomes more expensive as well. Intuitively, insurance is now an
inferior product for people living close to the excluded provider. To convince these customers
to buy insurance, the price may have to fall.
3.4. Example
We now discuss an explicit example with uniform distribution G (σ) = σ
σ̄
with σ ∈ [0, σ̄] and
choose c = 0. Assume that in equilibrium, 0 < σ (x, φ) < σ̄. The first order condition for the
provider in a common equilibrium then reads












where b solves b = − log(b), which implies b ≈ 0.6. Note that pc is independent of φ. Then










Next, consider the case of an exclusive contract between the insurer and provider P1. The
first order conditions become













− (p1 − p2 + t)
]
(13)
which can be written as
p1 = b(t + p2) (14)
p2 =
b(t + p2)







− (b + 1)t + (1 − b)p2
)
. (15)
Figure 1 shows the distribution of uninsured for both the common and exclusionary equi-
librium for the case where t = 1, F σ̄ = 2. As mentioned, σ(x, .) is decreasing in x < 1
2
as
people further away from P1 have higher travel costs and hence face more risk. This makes
insurance more attractive. Note that under exclusion P2’s ratio of inframarginal over marginal
consumers exceeds the same ratio under common contracts, where the marginal uninsured con-
sumer is at the cusp of the line σ(x, .). In this example we find φc = 3.62, pc = 1.31 and
φe = 3.51, p1 = 1.49, p2 = 1.62.
Hence the price for uninsured treatments increases because of selective contracting (and
more so for p2 than for p1) due to the skewed distribution of uninsured consumers over the
Hotelling line. Provider P2 faces many inframarginal consumers (relative to marginal ones)
and hence raises p2. As prices are strategic complements, p1 increases as well. Insurance under
selective contracting is an inferior product for customers close to P2. To induce these people
to buy insurance as well, compared to the common equilibrium I lowers φ in the exclusive
outcome. Consumers not too close to provider 2 buy more insurance under exclusion. For
these consumers the price for uninsured treatment is higher and φ is lower in the exclusion
equilibrium as compared to the common outcome.
4. Exclusive equilibria with two insurers
So far we have focused on the case with one insurer. One might think that the introduction
of competition at the insurer level limits the scope for anticompetitive behavior. In this sec-
tion we therefore explore the case of two (ex ante) undifferentiated insurers who engage in
Bertrand competition. Although this drastically changes the providers’ bargaining positions,
and hence the allocation of the producer surplus, we demonstrate that the exclusive outcome
above, and the associated anti-competitive effects persist in this setting. We also analyze the
common outcome under downstream competition and find that it suffers from a (horizontal)
double marginalization inefficiency which raises insurance prices even above the industry profit
maximizing prices. A ban on selective contracting is therefore clearly not desirable. In fact,
we demonstrate that an alternative, symmetric outcome with selective contracts is preferable.
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P1 P2 P1 P2
IBIA IA IB
E EE
Figure 2: Two ways to get exclusion with two insurers and two providers.
This outcome, where no provider is excluded from insurance, allows consumers to insure and
choose their preferred provider. And insurance is cheaper than under common contracts.
With two insurers, we consider two types of exclusion outcomes as illustrated in figure 2.15
In the first (symmetric) case P1 contracts exclusively with Ia, and P2 contracts exclusively with
Ib. We denote this outcome by E. In this case insurers Ia and Ib offer differentiated products
and hence are able to raise their premiums above costs. The other type of exclusive outcome is
where P1 contracts exclusively with both Ia and Ib. This outcome is denoted by EE. Here Ia
and Ib offer homogeneous goods and Bertrand competition implies pricing at marginal costs:
φ = (1 − F )p̃ee1 , where p̃
ee
1 denotes the price per treatment that insurers pay to P1.
The next result shows that the EE outcome is the same as the exclusive equilibrium in the
monopoly insurer case. Moreover, it is an equilibrium outcome if the exclusion outcome is an
equilibrium in the monopoly insurer case. In this sense, the results we describe in section 3 are
robust to the introduction of insurer competition.




total in lemma 1 holds. Then the exclusive
outcome of lemma 4 is an equilibrium in the case with two insurers as well. This equilibrium
is implemented in the EE outcome.
As we show in theorem 1 the goal of the selective contract is its anti-competitive effect. By
creating a skewed distribution of uninsured consumers, prices for uninsured treatments increase.
This increase in uninsured prices further makes insurance more attractive. This intuition also
applies with competing insurers.
At first sight, it looks attractive to avoid this EE outcome by banning exclusive contracts.
However, this is not a good idea. The prices with common contracts in case of insurer compe-
tition are actually higher than with common contracts and a monopoly insurer. We consider a
15To check the stability of the outcomes, we consider a third, hybrid case in the appendix that we denote
CE.
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symmetric equilibrium here with common contracts.16
Proposition 3 The insurance premium with two perfectly competitive insurers and common
contracts will be higher than the insurance premium with a monopolist insurer and common
contracts.
The intuition for this result is a horizontal analogue of double marginalization. To see this,
consider the case where provider i charges p̃i per treatment to each insurer. Since consumers
are insured, they will always choose the closest provider in case they need treatment. That is,
the insured market splits at 1
2
. Bertrand competition on the insurance market with insurers
offering homogeneous products then implies φ = 1
2
(1 − F )(p̃1 + p̃2). Hence when provider P1
increases p̃1 he reduces insured demand for P2. Provider P1 overlooks this negative externality
and hence raises p̃1 and thereby φ above the level that is optimal with a monopoly insurer.
A monopoly insurer makes a profit of his own and internalizes this externality. It can use
transfers to solve the double marginalization problem and hence prices are lower. In fact, with
a monopoly insurer p̃i (i = 1, 2) and φ are set to maximize industry profits (see lemma 5 in the
appendix).
Note that, if the number of providers increases, this externality becomes stronger and hence
prices under common representation higher.
Therefore the implication of our analysis is not to ban exclusive contracts. The following
result demonstrates that outcome E is actually the preferable one.
Proposition 4 Assume that both in the common case with monopoly insurer and in case E
there is a unique symmetric equilibrium. Then insurance premia are lower in outcome E than
in the common outcome with a monopoly insurer, and a fortiori lower than those prevailing in
the common outcome with insurer competition.
The result is driven by the fact that ∂pi/∂φb ≥ 0 in the symmetric equilibrium, as we
demonstrate in the proof. This is intuitive since insured care and uninsured care are substitutes
competing in prices. As usual, reaction functions in prices are upward sloping. The monopoly
insurer choosing the insurance price φ for all consumers to maximize industry profits (lemma
5 in the appendix) takes this effect of φ on non-insured prices into account. In case E, the
combination P1 and Ia overlooks this positive externality on P2 and Ib. Hence they do not raise
φ (and thereby p1, p2) to the same extent.
Summarizing, we have the following results. If there is a monopoly insurer, exclusive con-
tracts lead to anti-competitive effects compared to the common outcome (theorem 1). With
competing insurers, an outcome with exclusive contracts can be better from a social point
of view than the common outcome if the exclusive contracts are “equally distributed” over
16Assume that P2 offers p̃2 to both Ia and Ib. If P1 would offer a different transfer price to Ia than the price
it offers to Ib, the insurer with the higher price would be out of business, leading to –de facto– exclusion. To
see this, note that an insurer who faces transfer prices p̃1, p̃2 has to price at least at φ =
1
2
(1 − F )(p̃1 + p̃2) to
avoid losses (as insured consumers go to the closest provider). Because in the common equilibrium Ia and Ib
offer identical products, they need to have the same costs to both survive.
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providers (outcome E). More generally, the policy implication is that the concentration of ex-
clusive contracts over providers should be low. If –in contrast– exclusive contracts are concen-
trated among providers, then a provider with no contracts faces relatively many inframarginal
uninsured customers. This leads to a high uninsured price for this provider. Because of upward
sloping reaction functions, other providers will increase their uninsured prices as well. This does
not happen if the excluded provider does not have the (market) power to raise its uninsured
price.
5. Discussion
In the analysis above we assumed that no efficiency gains from selective contracting exist. In
practice, selective contracting can enhance efficiency because of several reasons. For instance,
one provider may offer a low quality service at a high cost. It may then be socially optimal
to exclude this provider. Alternatively, investments may be specific to the relation between a
particular provider and insurer. If the provider has to make these investments and there is a
risk of free riding by other providers contracting with the same insurer, the level of investments
will be suboptimal. Selective contracting can then help to increase such investments. What are
our policy recommendation taking efficiency gains into account?
Theorem 1 shows that anti-competitive effects are absent if the excluded provider faces
“enough” competition on its uninsured market. Hence if insurers exclude such a provider, an
efficiency rationale for the exclusion must exist. In such a case there is no need to intervene
for a competition authority or regulator. In practice, this can be the case when two (or more)
nearby hospitals offer the same range of treatments. If one such hospital is excluded by all
insurers, policymakers need not worry about anti-competitive effects.
A second point is that selective contracting in our framework is extreme in the sense that
an insured patient who gets treatment at an excluded provider has to pay the full price of
the treatment him/herself. Alternatively, with point of service options, an insured patient may
face higher co-payments when visiting an excluded provider than a network provider. Although
this reduces the size of the anti-competitive effects, it still implies that fewer consumers close
to an excluded provider are willing to buy insurance (compared to the common outcome).
The distribution of uninsured consumers will still be skewed, although less so. Hence the
anti-competitive effects will not disappear. If in a certain case there are worries about the
competitive effects of selective contracting, the regulator or competition authority may want
to impose a maximal difference in co-payments between providers that are in and out of the
insurer’s network. This will reduce the number of inframarginal uninsured customers close to
the excluded provider.
We assumed in our model that consumers are differentiated along their risk aversion param-
eter σ. One may wonder whether we would find different results if instead differentiation comes
from F , the probability of a health shock. It is not difficult to show that the basic mechanism
– selective contracting leads to skewed demand and less aggressive competition in the market
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for uninsured – continues to hold in this case.17
Finally, we have assumed that insurers are homogeneous for consumers if they contract the
same providers. However, insurers can differ in other dimensions. They may for example offer
different co-payments or reimburse a different set of treatments. If consumers have preferences
over both providers and insurers, it is no longer obvious that outcome E in figure 2 is desirable.
In this outcome, a consumer with a preference for, say, provider P1 is forced to get insurance
from Ia. The fact that providers and insurers are bundled in this outcome may lead to unde-
sirable effects as consumers can no longer mix and match. The trade off between (horizontal)
double marginalization in the common outcome and possible anti-competitive effects due to
bundling is left for future research.
6. Conclusions
The analysis in this paper is motivated by the diverging predictions concerning selective con-
tracting in the health care and industrial economics literature. The health literature stresses
that selective contracting increases insurers’ bargaining power. This leads to lower prices for
insured treatments and hence lower health care costs. As health care expenditures are on the
rise in most –if not all– developed countries, such reductions in treatment prices are welcome.
The (post Chicago) industrial economics literature stresses the possibilities for anti-competitive
effects of such exclusionary arrangements. Using the general framework introduced by Bernheim
and Whinston (1998) we have two main implications. First, since it is optimal for providers
and insurers to use two-part tariffs, selective contracting does not directly reduce the price per
treatment. We show that the option of selective contracting indeed increases rents for insurers.
However, this rent is transferred using the fixed part of the two-part tariff. Because the price
per treatment is not directly affected selective contracting does not necessarily make insurance
cheaper for consumers.
Second, we show that selective contracting can indeed have anti-competitive effects. If
exclusive contracts are concentrated among providers, uninsured prices tend to go up. With
competing insurers, banning selective contracting tends to lead to higher prices than an outcome
with exclusive contracts where each provider has at least one contract.
The policy implication is that selective contracting is fine as long as there are no excluded
providers with (market) power to raise their prices on the uninsured market. If such providers
do exist, the trade off between anti-competitive effects and possible efficiency gains needs to be
resolved.
Clearly our analysis is not restricted to health insurance. Indeed selective contracting is
also an issue in car insurance, where insurers may want to steer consumers to a restricted
set of repair shops. The desirability of such behavior is hotly debated in for instance the US,
Australia and the Netherlands. According to Sydney Morning Herald (2006) and Winter (2008)
17Note that differentiation with respect to F introduces adverse selection in the model. Although this issue
is not directly related to selective contracting, our assumption that insurers only offer contracts with full
reimbursement is less applicable in this context.
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in the US slightly over half of all states have adopted anti-steering laws banning such behavior.
According to the analysis above this is not the optimal policy response. It is better to allow
steering as long as repair shops without a contract with an insurer do not have market power.
20
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8. Appendix
Proof of lemma 1
First consider exclusive equilibria. Both providers make an offer for an exclusive contract. We
study a (hypothetical) equilibrium where the contract is with provider P1. Both I and P1 agree
on their bilaterally optimal transfer price, and use a lump sum transfer t1 from P1 to I to take
care of any redistribution of profits among them. This redistribution is, of course, constrained
by the (non-accepted) offer made by P2, involving transfer t2. The payoffs of both offers to the
three parties are then
offer from 1 offer from 2
I : π
(1)

















I + t1 = π
(2)
I + t2
The left hand side cannot be smaller or P1’s contract would not be accepted, and it cannot be






or P2 would profitably increase t2 slightly and get accepted (as a result of the previous condi-
tion). Following Bernheim and Whinston (1998), we focus on the equilibrium where the latter
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condition is satisfied with equality. In other words, we consider the smallest possible t1 and t2,
since that is the equilibrium that maximizes both providers’ payoffs (and providers make the















Thirdly, the equilibrium should satisfy
π
(1)
1 − t1 ≥ π
(2)
1






or in other words, the exclusive contract is with the provider for which total sector profits are
maximized. In a symmetric case we, of course, have equality, and hence two (mirror image)
exclusive equilibria exist.This concludes the proof of the first part of the lemma.
Next consider an equilibrium where the insurer contracts with both providers. In this
situation we have payoffs















and we again need to determine the equilibrium transfers. These transfers (and hence the
insurer’s share) are bounded from below by the requirement that no provider wants to deviate
and offer an exclusive contract which gives both it and the insurer higher profits (at the expense































for a profitable deviation to exist. A similar argument holds for tc1, and therefore in any common










Furthermore, since any provider can always choose not to supply (and leave the insurer to an







or Πctotal ≥ Π
(j)
total
for a common equilibrium to exist. Suppose then that this holds. Again, the best equilibrium






















Solving for the transfers and inserting in the aggregate pay-offs completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 2
















which is true by assumption. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 1
We will demonstrate that for any fixed φ > (1 − F )c it is the case that, first, φ
1−F
= φ̃ > pe1(φ)
and second pe2(φ) > p
e
1(φ) > p
c(φ), assuming that pc(φ) is unique. For convenience we restate
the system of first order conditions combined with rational expectations that determines these
prices. We have the common price pc(φ) defined by the solution to the following equation



















F (p2 + 2ptx)
Exclusive prices pe1(φ), p
e
2(φ) are the solution to the following system
F 1 (p1, p2) ≡ −
1
2t







dx = 0 (17)
F 2 (p1, p2) ≡ −
1
2t


























φ̃ − (p2 + t − 2tx)
F (p2 + t)(p2 + t − 2tx)
.
For proving the first inequality, φ̃ > pe1(φ), suppose by contradiction that φ̃ ≤ p
e
1(φ). Then
for each x < x̄, eveyone will choose insurance, or σ1(x) = 0. For equation (17) to hold (where
the integral equals zero), it must be the case that pe1(φ) = c. But then φ̃ ≤ p
e
1(φ) = c violates
the condition on φ > (1 − F )c. Hence we find φ̃ > pe1(φ).
Next we prove the second set of inequalities. From the first order conditions we first show
that pe2(φ) > p
e
1(φ). We then demonstrate that this implies p
e
1(φ) > pc(φ).
Step 1: pe2(φ) > p
e
1(φ)














φ̃ − (p2 − t + 2tx)












We note that for x < 1
2
:
φ̃ − (p − t + 2tx)





so that p2 = p1 (and x̄ =
1
2
) cannot be a solution. Observe next that p2 < p1 cannot hold





dxG (σ2 (p2, 1 − x)) >
∫ x̄
0
dxG (σ2 (p2, 1 − x)) >
∫ x̄
0
dxG (σ1 (p1, x))
so that the right hand side of equation (19) above is positive, while the left hand side is negative.
We conclude that pe2(φ) > p
e
1(φ).
Step 2: pe1(φ) > p
c(φ)
Again simplifying notation by writing p1, p2, p
c, we observe that F 1(p1, p2) = 0 implicitly defines
a continuous function p1(p2). We are going to demonstrate that this function is such that
p2 > p1 ⇒ p1 > p
c.
First, since F 1 reduces to F c when both arguments are equal, we have
p1 = p2 ⇒ p1 = p
c
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because of the assumption of a unique solution pc to F c = 0.








σ (x̄) g (σ (x̄)) +
1
2t
G (σ (x̄)) > 0
as long as p1 ≥ c, so F
1 is strictly increasing in p2 for given p1. Since F
1(pc, pc) = 0, this implies
that
F 1 (pc, p2) = 0 ⇒ p2 = p
c
From these two observations we have that the function p1 (p2) crosses the lines p1 = p2 and
p1 = p
c only once, in their mutual crossing point p1 = p2 = p
c.
We now conclude this part of the proof by showing that for any p1 < p
c we also have p2 < p1
(which leads to a contradiction as step 1 proved that p2 > p1). We note that at p1 = c < p
c,
p2 = p1 − t (we need that x̄ = 0 otherwise F
1(c, p2) = 0 is not satisfied). Based on the single
crossing point just demonstrated, we have that pc > p1 > p2 for all p2 < p
c.
As a result, from step 1 we have that pe2(φ) > p
e
1(φ), and from step 2 we learn that this can
only solve the system if also pe1(φ) > p
c(φ). Q.E.D.
Proof of theorem 1
In order to prove this result, we first introduce and prove four lemmas.
Lemma 5 In the common equilibrium, φ will be chosen to optimize total sector profits.
Proof of lemma 5 First, note that pc only depends on transfer prices p̃1, p̃2 through φ.
The insurance premium φ itself is a function of p̃1, p̃2. Write common (reduced form) profits
for each firm as πI(φ(p̃1,p̃2), p̃1, p̃2), πi(φ(p̃1, p̃2), p̃i) (for i = 1, 2). Optimizing bilateral profits

















We now observe that ∂πI
∂φ
= 0 (as the insurer chooses φ to maximize its profits). The sum of
the last two terms is zero as well since both profits only depend explicitly on p̃1 through the




Since this holds for both i = 1, 2, we find in the optimum that φ maximizes total (common)
profits, i.e., the sum πI + π1 + π2. Q.E.D.


















Proof of lemma 6 If pe1(φ) ≥ pr the result obviously holds (with equality). Assume







pe1(φ) < pr, increasing p1 to pr has three effects:
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• profits from uninsured customers that continue to go to P1 increase,
• some uninsured customers switch from P1 to provider P2 with the higher margin (as
pe2(φ) > p
e
1(φ) by proposition 1) and
• some uninsured customers that used to go to P1 decide to take insurance which has a
higher margin as φ̃ > pe1(φ).
All three effects raise sector profits and hence the left hand side of equation (21) indeed
exceeds the right hand side. Q.E.D.
Lemma 7 In a subgame perfect common equilibrium where p2 ≤ pr is binding (i.e. p2 = pr),
we have
φ̃ > pr (22)
p1 ≥ pr (23)
with p1 = pr if we assume that the upperbound pr holds for p1 as well.
Proof of lemma 7
First we prove inequality (22) by contradiction. Suppose that the inequality does not hold,
i.e. assume that φ̃ ≤ pr. We consider two cases:
• p1 < φ̃(≤ pr = p2)
• p1 ≥ φ̃(≤ pr = p2)
In the first case all customers close to P2 take out insurance (as it is cheaper in expected
terms than getting uninsured treatment). Let x̃ denote the customer (with σ = 0) furthest away
from P1 without insurance. It easily seen that x̃ >
1
2









x̄ denotes the uninsured customer indifferent between going to P1 and P2. However, this implies
that in the final stage of the game p1 does not maximize P1’s profits. If p1 is raised, P1 gains
over all its inframarginal uninsured customers and it loses at the margin (p1−c)G(σ(x̃)) = 0 by
the definition of x̃. Consider the second case with p1 ≥ φ̃. Then everyone takes out insurance
and p1, p2 ≥ φ̃ is indeed a Nash equilibrium. However, it is not subgame perfect. To see this,
consider a consumer at x = 1
2
with σ = 0 who deviates and does not buy insurance. At the final
stage, P1 and P2 compete (without inframarginal uninsured consumers) at price p1 = p2 = c.
Since consumers have rational expectations, they foresee that P1 and P2 will lower their price
in the final stage. Hence p1, p2 ≥ φ̃ is not a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Therefore we find φ̃ > pr.
Next we prove inequality (23) by contradiction. Hence assume that p1 < pr while p2 ≤ pr
is binding. Then the first order conditions for p1, p2 in a common outcome can be written as
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H1 (p1, pr) ≡ −
1
2t








H2 (p1, pr) ≡ −
1
2t


























Fpr(pr + 2t(1 − x))
.
From H2 − H1 we find after a change of variables

















F (p21 + 2p1tx)
)
dx ≥ 0 (24)
We note that for p1 < pr:
1 − x̄ < x̄
φ̃ − pr
F (p2r + 2prtx)
<
φ̃ − p1
F (p21 + 2p1tx)
which implies that equation (24) cannot hold. This contradiction implies p1 ≥ pr. Q.E.D.
Lemma 8 If p2 ≤ pr is binding, then p
e
1(φ) = p
c(φ). That is, the functions linking P1’s
uninsured price to the insurance premium φ are the same under common and exclusive contracts.
Proof of lemma 8 First, note that the uninsured consumer indifferent between providers








Second, the first order condition for p1 can be written as H
1(p1, pr) = 0 where H
1 and σ1 are
defined in the proof of lemma 7 above. Since x̄(p1), H
1 and σ1 hold for both the common and
exclusive outcomes, we find that the function p1(φ) is the same for common and exclusive if
p2 ≤ pr is binding. Q.E.D.
Having proved these lemmas, we can now proceed to proving the theorem. By Lemma 1,
to prove the theorem we need to show that under the cap on P2’s uninsured price, p2 ≤ pr,
28
total profits under common representation are always larger than total profits under exclusivity.
In the equations below pe2(φ) denotes P2’s best response under the restriction that this price
cannot exceed pr. That is, it denotes the minimum of pr and the solution to equation (18).
18
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c
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Line (26) follows from the assumption that the cap binds for p2 in the common equilibrium,
and the fact that in common equilibrium φ maximizes total profits (lemma 5 above). Equation
(27) follows from lemma 7. Line (28) looks at the exclusive situation where the insured can only
visit provider 1, where we use that the function p1(φ) is the same under common and exclusive
contracts (keeping p2 fixed). If P2’s uninsured price is still fixed at the cap, total sector profits
can only go down, since consumers on the righthand side of the beach (x close to 1) are less
likely to choose the (higher margin: see (22)) insurance contract. Line (29) asserts that in the
optimum, an industry profit maximizer would choose P2’s uninsured price at the cap in the
exclusive situation. Indeed, lowering p2 has two effects:
• fewer people take insurance which has a higher margin (again see (22)) and
• some uninsured switch from P1 to P2 while max{p
e
1(φ), pr} ≥ pr ≥ p2.
Both effects reduce sector profits and hence the equality in (29) holds. Line (30) restricts
P2’s uninsured price to its equilibrium best response (subject to the cap) and hence profits
cannot exceed (29). In order to prove the inequality in equation (31) we consider two cases:
• in case pe2(φ) = pr, lemma 7 implies p
e
1(φ) ≥ pr and hence the equation holds with equality;
• in case pe2(φ) < pr we know from lemma 6 that the inequality holds.
P2’s profits in line (32) are evaluated at the value of φ (denoted by φ
∗) that maximizes
bilateral profits for I and P1. This inequality is evident. Q.E.D.
18Note that the proof also applies if pr is the upperbound on p1. In that case, one should read the proof with
p1(φ) ≤ pr in mind.
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Proof of proposition 2
Consider the case where P1 has exclusive contracts with Ia and Ib. In this case, Ia and Ib offer
identical products and their profits are zero. Hence we find φee = p̃ee1 and P1 chooses p̃
ee
1 to
maximize the sum of profits of P1, Ia and Ib. This is exactly the same expression as equation
(6) in the case with only one insurer. Hence, here we get the same φ and consequently the
same uninsured prices p1, p2 as above with exclusion and one insurer (see lemma 4).
Let πeei denote the profits of provider i when i has exclusive contracts with both Ia and Ib.
In this case, the profits for j 6= i are denoted π00j . As noted, in this case insurer profits equal
zero. If each provider has one exclusive contract, profits of provider i are denoted by πei . Profits
of insurer k are then denoted by πek. Note that these profits can be positive, as insurers offer
differentiated products in this case.
The transfer tee offered by provider P1 to both insurers has to satisfy the following inequal-
ities
πee1 − 2t
ee ≥ π001 (33)
π002 + t




ee ≥ πee2 (35)
πee1 − t
ee ≥ πe1 + π
e
a (36)
The first inequality says that P1 prefers to have both exclusive contracts rather than none.
The second inequality states that the coalition of P2 and Ia cannot gain by deviating to a
bilateral exclusionary contract. The third inequality asserts that the coalition P2, Ia and Ib
cannot deviate to exclusive contracts (i.e. the mirrored EE outcome). Finally, P1 and Ia
should not prefer to switch from EE to E.
Using the symmetry of the outcomes (e.g. πee1 = π
ee













The same condition results from the sum of (34) and (36). In words, we see outcome EE if
total industry profits in case one provider contracts exclusively with both insurers is higher than
total industry profits in the outcome where each provider contracts exclusively with one insurer.





1 holds. To see this, first note that because the outcomes are identical, also the profits are







Next, in the E outcome, two symmetrically placed provider-insurer combinations compete. In
the symmetric equilibrium where both choose the same φe, we know that non-insured prices
are given by equation (2), as in the common equilibrium with a monopolist insurer. Further,
in the monopoly insurance common outcome, φ is chosen to maximize industry profits (lemma



























and inequality (37) is satisfied. We therefore prove that an exclusive equilibrium exists, and
that it takes the form of the EE situation.
Next we may check that equilibria involving non-exclusive contracts do not exist under the
assumptions. We may distinguish two types of common equilibria: one where both insurers con-
tract with both providers, the CC-equilibrium, and one where one insurer contracts with both
providers and the other has an exclusive contract with provider P1 only, the CE-equilibrium. A
similar reasoning as above shows that neither common equilibrium can exist in this case. Con-
sider first CC . The following two inequalities are necessary conditions for a CC equilibrium



















The first inequality implies that P1, Ia and Ib have no incentive to deviate from the common out-
come to the EE outcome. The second inequality implies that P2 has no incentive to withdraw












Again note that the industry profits in the common outcome in case of two insurers cannot
exceed industry profits with one insurer as industry profits are maximized with one insurer




total the inequality above has to be violated.















and addition of these conditions yields the familiar total profit condition. Both insurers neces-
sarily charge the same insurance premium, because they compete in homogeneous products for
consumers that want to go to provider 1. By the same considerations as before, CE profits are
necessarily lower than the monopolist insurer common profits, and we find that CE cannot be
an equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 3
We demonstrate that at the monopoly optimum value φ∗, either provider will have an incentive
to drive up the premium.
Under insurer competition we have φ̃ = 1
2
(p̃1 + p̃2). Either insurer will price at its marginal
costs and make zero profits. Provider P1 will take p̃2 as given and choose p̃1 to optimize his
profits (which now equal his joint profits with the insurer, the latter’s profits being zero).









Gdx(pc(φ̃) − c) (42)
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(1 − G)dx(φ̃ − p̃2)
Since at the hypothetical equilibrium, p̃2 = φ̃







(1 − G)dx > 0
so P1 has an incentive to drive up φ̃. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 4
For the E-equilibrium we define total profits for either vertical chain (indexed by 1a and 2b) in
terms of reduced form profit functions, depending only on the two insurers’ premiums, φa, φb
(since uninsured prices depend on these two insurance premiums).
Π1a = π̃a (φa, φb) + π̃1 (φa, φb)
Π2b = π̃b (φa, φb) + π̃2 (φa, φb)
This is a simple two-player game in which either chain selects its Nash-optimal φα given its
opponent’s choice φβ(β 6= α). The equilibrium is characterized by the system of two first-order
conditions. We assume there is a unique symmetric equilibrium φa = φb = φ
E .
The common monopoly insurer game is rather similar: here we saw the equilibrium consists
of the single φ that optimizes total sector profits. Profits in this case are equal to
Πc (φ) = Π1a (φ, φ) + Π2b (φ, φ)
i.e. they are related to the single chain E-profits subject to the condition that φ1 = φ2.














This differs from the sum of the E-equilibrium FOCs by the cross derivatives, ∂Πα
∂φβ
(β 6= α).











≥ 0 at φE .
To check this (note that by symmetry we only need to check one), let us analyze the
E-equilibrium first order conditions in more detail. Although we consider the symmetric equi-
librium, we need to worry about first-order deviations from symmetry as say φb increases a bit
beyond φE.
First, if someone chooses an insurer, which insurer is preferred to him? The consumer at x
indifferent between either insurer has risk aversion paramerer s(x) defined by:
s (x, φa, φb) =
φa − φb




and for φb > φa, only consumers on the righthand side of the market with σ > s(x) will consider
the righthand side insurer.
Second, each consumer will trade off connecting with his preferred insurer and not insuring
at all. This gives rise to the function σ (x).
Suppose again that φb > φa. We define the point x̄ as before, the location where unin-
sured are indifferent between either hospital. We define the point x̃ > 1
2
where σ (x̃, φa, φb) =
s (x̃, φa, φb).
19 Marginally insured consumers between 0 and x̄ choose between Ia and P1, those
between x̄ and x̃ choose between Ia and P2 and those with x > x̃ choose between Ib and P2.
So we define σ(x, φa, φb) separately for the three regimes.













Again, prices pi are defined implicitly by










For defining the profits, we also need the value x′, defined by s(x′(x, φa, φb)) = σ̄, the












(G (s(x, φa, φb)) − G (σ(x, φa, φb))) dx(φa − c)









Now we are going to take φb-derivatives in the symmetric equilibrium, at φa = φb = φ
E,
where p1,2 = p
E. Note that in this equilibrium, we have x̄ = x′ = x̃ = 1
2
. This will cause several
























































We use the following two steps to show that these two inequalities hold. It then follows






For φb > φa, we find by subtracting the two implicit equations for the prices (after a change
of variables)
(p2 − p1)















φa − (p2 − t + 2tx)















at φa = φb.
Step 2: ∂p1/∂φb ≥ 0
We now focus on the defining equation for p1. Note that this does not depend directly on φb,
but only indirectly through x̄. We know from the first step that ∂x̄
∂φb
≥ 0 because ∂(p2−p1)
∂φb
≥ 0.
We can now follow the exact same arguments as in step 2 of the proof of proposition 1 to
demonstrate that the function p1(p2) implied by the price condition only crosses p1 = p2 once,
namely at the point p1 = p2 = pc (evaluated at φa = φ
E). Since for φb > φa we know that
p2 > p1, we again find that
∂p1
∂φb
≥ 0 at the φE equilibrium.
Combining these two steps with the previous result, we find that ∂Π1a/∂φb, ∂Π2b/∂φa ≥ 0
and thus φE ≤ φc. Q.E.D.
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